Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Dangerous Champions of IT Innovation
Janis L. Gogan
Bentley University, USA

Kieran Conboy
NUI Galway, Ireland

Joseph W. Weiss
Bentley University, USA

jgogan@bentley.edu

kieran.conboy@nui galway.ie

jweiss@bentley.edu

Abstract
An IT innovation champion is a self-appointed
advocate of a hardware, software or data innovation.
A dangerous IT innovation champion can expose an
IT innovation project, as well as one or more
operational processes and the organization, to
reputational, financial, and other risks. While most
prior studies see champions as heroes who drive
projects forward through advocacy and marshaling
of resources, some prior studies reported that
champions do not always succeed and some reported
that ineffective or dysfunctional champions may
cause harm. We answer calls for more research on
dysfunctional or ineffective innovation champions, by
reflecting on particularly dangerous high-level IT
innovation champions revealed in three field-based
case studies. Based on our study findings, we discuss
how to spot dangerous champions in time to mitigate
high project and business risks.

1. Introduction
Organizations vary in their readiness to utilize
bleeding-edge emerging IT applications. Top
management support is often seen as a panacea that
helps ensure IT project success. However, some
executives are high on enthusiasm but low on
awareness of technical, organizational, interorganizational and other risks. This paper considers
problems that these high-level IT innovation
champions (CEOs and CIOs) can cause, by
promoting risky new IT applications or by allocating
resources and attention to them, while giving
insufficient focus to processes, procedures and
controls that are needed to ensure that new or
ongoing systems perform reliably.
After defining the concept of a dangerous
champion, we present and discuss five examples
from prior case research: a dangerous CEO-champion
described in one classic teaching case [19] and a
dangerous CIO-champion described in a classic
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teaching case [17]. Then we describe three dangerous
IT innovations champions (two CIOs, one CIO)
observed in our recent field-based studies.

1.1 Dangerous IT Innovation Champions
Dangerous IT innovation champions can be
difficult to spot, since at first their behavior seems
similar to effective IT champions who promote
promising but risky new technologies [22]. Effective
IT innovation champions promote new development
methods, new software application, or use of new IT
devices [1]. They are persuasive – often persistently
so! They keep advocating for a particular IT
platform, device, application or method, until
resources are provided to implement it.
As is pointed out in a recent literature review [20]
and in Section 2 (below), much prior champion
research – including a stream of management studies
that addressed champions of new product innovation
and a stream of IS studies of IT innovation which
focused on effective champions. Some prior studies
cautioned that a champion could be ineffective or
possibly over-zealous. Our research shows that while
all champions articulate a persuasive vision about the
focal innovation, some champions do not succeed in
realizing value from it. An over-zealous champion
can cause harm by diverting resources away from
worthier projects, or by boldly entering innovation
territory for which they lack appropriate knowledge
and suitable oversight capabilities. These champions
are dangerous because they do not know what they
do not know, and thus expose the innovation project,
neglected processes or projects, and the organization
to unacceptably high risk, without initiating
compensatory risk mitigation. They lack some
knowledge and capabilities necessary to achieve the
vision. If a champion does not recognize this
knowledge deficit, they can make risky decisions or
fail to mitigate important risks.
While most champions focus on a compelling
long-range vision, some dangerous IT innovation
champions focus so intently on that vision that they
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fail to attend to evidence close at hand, such as
system-related problems that threaten day-to-day
operations. Therefore, in several ways dangerous IT
innovation champions threaten projects, operational
processes, and even their organizations.
In Section 1 we describe dangerous IT innovation
champions observed in two classic teaching cases.
After reviewing the literatures of new-product
champions and IT innovation champions in Section
2, we then describe three dangerous IT innovation
champions encountered in our recent field-based case
studies. We discuss our findings in light of a
framework that juxtaposes a champion’s focus on
innovation versus operational reliability, against the
champion’s relevant knowledge and expertise.
Two widely-taught field-researched teaching
cases -- Fixing the Payment System at Alvalade [19]
and CareGroup [17] -- describe managers we classify
as dangerous IT innovation champions. Each
champion – a CEO and a CIO -- was highly
persuasive about IT innovation, yet each exposed
their organization to danger. These champions did
not recognize that they lacked key capabilities and
knowledge to ensure project success and operational
and system reliability; we discuss them next.

1.2 An IT Innovation Fails on a Very Hot Day
The Alvalade case, set in Portugal in 2003,
introduces a former professional soccer player who
was the charismatic CEO of a catering company that
won the contract to manage all food/beverage
services in Lisbon’s new state-of-the-art Alvalade
Stadium [19]. Before first opening its doors, this
champion announced that an innovative payment
system (under development) would serve as the only
way fans could purchase food and beverages at
restaurants, bars, and cafeterias, and from
“ambulantes” walking around the stadium. Payment
cards would feature pictures and profiles of famous
soccer players (combining a payment mechanism
with a collectible memento). With great fanfare,
before the stadium’s inaugural soccer match
(Sporting Club of Portugal versus Manchester
United) a publicity campaign touted the payment
system. Meanwhile, work on the stadium fell behind
schedule (something the catering CEO had no
influence over). Construction delays meant that full
end-to-end testing of the new payment system was
not conducted. The systems integrator was only able
to conduct an incomplete test of the new system just
days before the opening match, with no time to test
the changes they made as a result of the test.
A mix of bad luck and technical and managerial
missteps caused the system to fail spectacularly

during the inaugural match, on an unseasonably hot
day. Nearly everything that could go wrong, did. A
rooftop antenna (controlling the wireless network
necessary for ambulantes to accept card payments)
overheated and failed. In the cafeteria, long lines
formed. Angry fans nearly rioted, because the system
slowed to a crawl. Cash registers did not include
bottled water as an authorized product (with
potentially fatal consequences for overheated fans)
and there was no contingency plan specifying what to
do about predictable problems like this which could
have been anticipated. Luckily, the Portuguese team
won the match and no riot or stampede occurred.
The catering company CEO should have
shouldered some blame for the fiasco, since the case
reveals that he exhibited five dangerous behaviors
before the match: 1) He set unrealistic expectations
by promoting the untested payment system. 2) The
CEO failed to hire a lawyer experienced in software
projects to review vendor proposals and the final
contract; 3) He selected a local vendor that had only
recently shifted from selling office equipment, to
packaged software in its product line and (quite
recently), to system integrator (this vendor had never
delivered a project of this scope, and they installed
the wrong version of SQL Server for the payment
system). 4) The CEO approved a design that would
relied entirely on the new payment card (no cash or
credit card payments); 5) He did not direct his staff to
develop contingency plans that could have spelled
out clear triggers and workarounds for various system
failure scenarios.

1.3 A Visionary’s Near Vision is Out of Focus
The CareGroup case describes a Boston-based
multi-hospital organization. Its CIO, John Halamka,
MD, was (and still is) a persuasive advocate for new
healthcare IT. Dr. Halamka is multi-talented: he
started a software company while a college student
majoring in computer science and economics, and
subsequently simultaneously studied engineering and
medicine. As CIO he oversaw an enterprise software
project that represented a big step forward for
CareGroup, which had grown by acquiring several
other hospitals. He also oversaw an electronic health
record project, an emergency department smart-board
system, and other IT innovation projects. With great
fanfare, he inserted an RFID chip in his arm to
highlight its potential role in supporting a fully
portable patient record. Currently, he writes and
frequently speaks about blockchain applications for
patient care and healthcare supply chains. This
tireless IT innovation champion paints a compelling
picture of a future where needed information will be
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seamlessly available across all patient encounters,
and in which all clinical and administrative processes
will be optimally efficient and effective.
While Dr. Halamka has impressive software
expertise and a remarkable ability to envision how
radical technologies can transform health care, in
2002 (the time of the case), his knowledge of how to
ensure a reliable operational backbone was
incomplete, and he was not cognizant of IS
governance and control best practices. This IT
innovation champion was dangerous because his
oversight of the people, tools, and capabilities for
ensuring system reliability was weak. While he
closely monitored new-technology projects, he did
not put appropriate mechanisms and staffing in place
to ensure 24/7 system reliability.
In 2002, CareGroup experienced a crisis when its
primary network crashed. Providers, accustomed to
24/7 access to online medical records, lab results, and
other applications, were forced to revert to ill-defined
paper-based processes for nearly a week. The CIO
heroically put in long hours, inspiring his medical
and IT staff to also do so. Thankfully, no patients
suffered serious harm during the network crisis. Still,
this unfortunate episode was costly and revealed
weak governance and oversight. Called before the
Board of Directors to explain what happened and
how he would ensure it would not happen again, Dr.
Halamka presented the following lessons learned
(paraphrased for brevity):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Keep network equipment up to date.
Never rely on a single source of expertise.
Keep IT knowledge up to date.
Control end-user experimentation.
Establish network change controls.
Recognize that mergers bring IT risks.
Don’t say yes to every user request.
Keep contingency plans current.
Provide redundant access to criticallyimportant information and data.
10. Life-cycle manage network components.
An applicant for the CIO job should know these
ten lessons, which are basic knowledge requirements
for the job. A CIO should anticipate adverse
scenarios and prepare contingency plans that let
employees know what to do when a network (or
software or database) fails. The Board needed to
consider whether to replace Dr. Halamka, hire a coCIO who would focus on system reliability and
security, or otherwise restructure the IT organization
so that someone would be accountable for ensuring
system reliability and another person held
accountable for innovation.

Our analysis of the Alvalade and CareGroup
cases (contributed by other field researchers) reveals
that dangerous IT innovation champions can expose
projects, processes, and their organizations to risk.
Yet, while many empirical studies focused on
effective champions, only a few studied ineffective
champions (those who promoted innovations that
failed or resulted in negative consequences). Few
papers explain how or why dangerous champions
expose their organizations to unacceptably high risks.

2. Innovation Champions: Prior Research
In this section we discuss two research streams:
management studies of champions of new products
based on innovative technologies (not necessarily IT)
and IS studies of IT innovation champions.

2.1 New-Product Champion Studies
Champions in Donald Schon’s classic 1963 study
were well-trained engineers who successfully
promoted radical technological innovation for new
products. Schon stated that each champion “actively
and vigorously [promotes his idea, despite initial]
sharp resistance … Many display persistence and
courage of heroic quality … a few become martyrs to
the championed idea.” [21], (p. 84). Following
Schon, many subsequent studies focused on
successful innovation champions. For example, a
1980 paper offered evidence that the champion role
evolves in step with an organization’s evolution (e.g.,
from small startup to single-product line integrated
enterprise, to diversified firm) and that champions
can emerge from many levels of the hierarchy, from
middle-managers on a technical or non-technical
career ladder, to the executive level [15]. However, a
1986 paper concluded that champions are “neither as
widespread, unambiguous, nor as unabashedly
desirable as the popular literature on innovation
would have us believe.” That paper called for
research addressing such questions as: “What are the
effects of championing an unsuccessful product? …
[and] Can there be too much championing?” [7].
A 2001 study reported that champions were
equally likely to advocate for innovations that
ultimately succeed as for innovations that fail; that
paper called for studies examining “methods for
holding champions accountable for their actions”
[16]. A 2005 paper warned: “Senior managers may
be swept away by champions’ passion and conviction
and potentially ignore danger signs that the project is
failing.” [11] (p. 660). Another paper warned that
innovation champions in the R&D group are “on the
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horns of a tricky dilemma. They must not only
determine how to best initiate and champion risky
projects destined for high failure rates, but also put in
place mechanisms for terminating them in a timely
manner” [13] (p. 1455). Executive champions
sometimes support highly risky projects that fail or
do not live up to expectations [8], [12].
Thus, some early champion studies in the
management literature extended Schon’s exploration
of effective champions, and other papers called for
studies examining ineffective or over-zealous
champions. A complete review of these studies is
beyond the scope and page constraints of this paper.
However, a 2015 paper [13] contends that some highlevel innovation champions engage in dangerous
escalation of commitment to a failing project [3]:
“Dysfunctional executive advocacy increases the
chances that ‘weak’ project decisions are made at the
initiation phase [and will] negatively influence
[project] termination decisions … [after failing to
use] best-practice project management and [project]
termination decision processes and practices.”

2.2 IT Innovation Champion Studies
In parallel with the management stream on
innovation champions, IS scholars also conducted
champion studies, as far back as a 1983 study of
decision support systems (DSS) champions [5]. A
1990 study that compared 25 champions of
successful IT innovation projects with 25 peer nonchampions (similarly-knowledgeable employees who
worked on the same projects but whose peers did not
see them as champions) reported that champions
exhibited more “transformational leader” behaviors
and used more varied influence tactics. These IT
innovation champions linked advocacy of the
innovation to “larger principles or unassailable
values,” and they provided “emotional meaning and
energy to the idea,” which helped build commitment
to it [10]. Yet, that paper cautioned that attempts to
formalize the champion role could backfire, by
undermining the champion’s “intrinsic motivation
and commitment [which could] jeopardize the
innovation’s ultimate success” [10]. In 1991, Beath
[1] observed that IT champion behavior is an
emergent process that cannot be effectively
mandated. She reported that successful mid-level or
executive IT champions appreciated three forms of
organizational support: relevant information (helps
them evaluate an IT innovation and persuade others
of its merits), assistance from high-quality IT staff
with needed expertise, and political support. About
half of the champions in that study worked with the
CIO to further their aims, while other champions

worked independently of the CIO. Beath saw the
“zealous champion” as potentially problematic: “IT
champions usually want IS managers to … postpone
other projects in favor of theirs. … The problem IS
managers confront is how to manage the constant
realignment of goal sets perturbed by a zealous
champion” [1] (p. 367). Thus, within the IS
community Beath raised the question of potentially
dysfunctional champions who could cause harm to
their organization’s IT architecture.
In 2004, Swanson and Ramiller [22] contended
that some leaders (and/or their organizations) are not
sufficiently mindful when it comes to IT innovation;
they saw mindfulness [23], [24], [6] as an antidote to
harmful champion faddishness: “Mindfulness … may
entail wariness …, and where needed it may foster a
resistance to jumping on innovation bandwagons …
Innovating mindfully may actually mean that a firm
forestalls or foreswears a new initiative, as facts and
conditions relevant to the local organizational context
dictate” [22] (p. 559). In this view of IT innovation, a
mindful organization “attends to an innovation with
reasoning grounded in its own organizational facts
and specifics. [This supports] sound judgements
about whether adopting a particular innovation is a
good thing to do, [and] when … and how
implementation and assimilation can be best pursued.
… Context matters in rendering such judgments” [22]
(p. 554). The mindful organization is wary of failure
and its leaders see near-miss incidents (like the
CareGroup network outage – a near-miss because no
patient suffered severe harm) as signals of possible
failure to come. In contrast, a “mindless”
organization is susceptible to fads: “When a
bandwagon develops around an IT innovation, the
mindless firm may join it … impressed by success
stories that appear to validate the innovation as a
good, maybe even irresistible idea.” [22] (p. 554).
Swanson and Ramiller warned against conflating
innovativeness and mindfulness: “The manager who
indiscriminately puts into play all kinds of new IT …
[does] little to foster organizational mindfulness”
[22] (p. 559). They called for studies to closely
examine mindful/mindless champion behavior.
Leaders walk a fine line between being mindful
and cautionary, versus being innovation enthusiasts.
A 2007 study reported that charismatic/inspirational
champion leadership (optimism, enthusiasm, vision,
confidence) and idealized influence (pride, purpose,
altruism, respect, morality, collectivity) contribute to
IT innovation project success [18]. A 2008 study of
high-level IT innovation champions contended that
top management support “is not simply one of many
CSFs (critical success factors) needed for project
success; [it] is the most important CSF,” and that
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“project managers cannot hold primary responsibility
for the realization of benefits because they tend to
leave a project after [its completion]… and before the
benefits are realized” [25] (p. 722). These IS studies
further affirm that a CEO or CIO can be an effective
IT innovation champion.
A review of 22 IT champion studies introduced
the term “dangerous champion” and called for
research on this topic (which answers earlier calls for
studies that challenge the idea that a champion is by
definition effective): “Many studies investigated
champions’ competencies and identities, relationships
and influence tactics, and roles and activities … yet it
is a rarely-disputed claim that champions have a
positive impact. We contend that dangerous
champions exhibit both effective and ineffective
champion behavior. Yet, few studies investigated
“champions’ negative impacts [or] … champions …
driving IS innovations in the wrong direction” [20].
To address this and other calls for further study of
ineffective, dysfunctional or dangerous champions,
we start with the premise (per [20]) that dangerous
champions exhibit behaviors similar to effective
champions: they articulate a persuasive case for the
risky new technology and persuade influential
decision makers to move forward with one or more
projects. Our study addresses two research questions:

RQ1: What behavior and capabilities distinguish
dangerous IT innovation champions, compared
with effective IT innovation champions?
 RQ2: Can dangerous IT innovation champion
behavior be spotted in time to mitigate
innovation risks?

3. Research Method
In Section 1 we discussed dangerous IT
innovation champions we identified in classic fieldresearched teaching cases developed by other
scholars. Here, we provide an overview of three
studies we conducted between 2017 and 2019. Each
study was designed to investigate a broader set of
questions related to IT innovation, and that included
interviews with high-level IT innovation champions:
 Case Study 1 (Blockchain and a Dangerous
CEO): Several small interconnected healthcarerelated organizations (two non-profits and two
for-profit organizations) collaborate to design
blockchain solutions to two interrelated
challenges: Dangerous medication waste and
underserved needy patients.
 Case Study 2 (AI and a Dangerous CEO): A
medium-sized physician group collaborates with
a software vendor to design a new system that



will, for the first time, apply two forms of
artificial intelligence to a set of mission-critical
tasks.
Mixed-Methods Study 3 (A Dangerously Agile
CIO): At a large financial services company, a
CIO-champion attempts to manage a complex
portfolio of IT projects by adopting various agile
development innovations.

In all of the case studies, the champion and one or
more subordinates and other stakeholders were
interviewed. Company archival documents as well as
public accounts of company activities were included
in the case study database.
From data thus gathered in these three studies, we
identified three dangerous high-level IT innovation
champions: two CEOs and one CIO. Similar to
effective champions described in prior studies, these
executives advocated persuasively for their chosen
innovations, and obtained or allocated supportive
resources. Yet, they exposed their organizations to
high risks, by failing to recognize needed knowledge
and capabilities or failing to attend to signals that
pointed to vulnerabilities that jeopardized system and
operational reliability. We describe these cases next.

4. Recent Cases
4.1 Blockchain and a Dangerous CEO
A pharmacist in a poor community serves patients
who struggle to afford their medications – especially
expensive cancer or HIV drugs. When some patients
died before taking all of their expensive unexpired
medications, their grieving relatives approached him,
hoping to donate the drugs to other patients.
However, in this U.S. state (and many others) it was
not legal for pharmacies to accept donations of
unused, unexpired drugs (some states allowed
redistribution of drugs donated by institutions, such
as hospitals or nursing homes, but not individuals).
The pharmacist became an ardent champion for
political and social change, and later, IT innovation.
He first set up a charity pharmacy to dispense
institutionally-donated drugs to needy customers -- at
no charge to his neediest customers and at low prices
to others. His team implemented a batch system for
refilling drugs used for treating chronic conditions:
once these drugs were dispensed in once-per-quarter
batches, operational costs dropped. By 2019 the
pharmacy was nearly able to sustain itself without
grant support. The social entrepreneur next lobbied
for passage of a new law in his state; now individuals
are permitted to donate unused medications to
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authorized charitable pharmacies, so this charity
pharmacy can receive expensive unused drugs from
individuals and dispense them to needy patients.
Hoping to scale up, the pharmacist/CEO attended
healthcare-related conferences to learn about best
practices in medication redistribution. Afterreading
about the use of blockchain in supply chains, he
became convinced that a blockchain could maintain
an irrefutable chain of custody so recycled drugs
would not fall into illegitimate hands. He next
assembled a team to design and test a solution to
safely, securely and efficiently receive expensive
drugs from institutional and individual donors, and
deliver them to patients. Since then, he founded
several organizations, each tackling an aspect of the
medication waste problem.
This champion now speaks at conferences about
his vision of blockchain as an enabling innovation for
tackling the medication waste problem while helping
needy patients. He has had no formal IT training, yet
espouses a “fail-forward” incremental development
philosophy [2] (create and test a rough prototype, get
customer feedback on it, modify it in response to the
feedback, and so on until a design emerges that
shows strong customer acceptance). Meanwhile, he
does not fully appreciate the financial and project
risks his several organizations face. None of the four
organizations he founded is self-sustainable; all are in
danger of backsliding if he does not closely monitor
operational details. Each organization is small but
growing, which creates risky instability. Each venture
needs financial backing to bridge to a state where
revenues reliably exceed costs.
Regarding IT project risks: according to Gartner,
blockchain applications in healthcare in general, and
particularly in logistics/transportation and supply
chains, have not reached the Peak of Inflated
Expectations. These applications are “embryonic” –
at least ten years from widespread acceptance and use
[9]. Gartner does predict the blockchain solutions
market will grow to $3 trillion, but not before 2030
[4]. So, any blockchain project aiming to solve the
medication waste problem is risky. In a small
organization, such risk can be dangerous.
This CEO might not yet fully appreciate the
implications of an immutable blockchain. The “failforward” approach does work well in some
component-based software development contexts.
However, a blockchain prototype does not evolve
into a strong application. Changes to a blockchain
produce a cumbersome, opaque, and unmanageable
design. Instead of failing forward by retaining some
workable code and building on it, each blockchain
prototype must be discarded; the development team
starts fresh with the next version (and the next and

the next) until they can commit to a design they
expect will not change. This is analogous to creating
several minimally viable products (MVPs) out of
inexpensive materials; each physical prototype is
evaluated and discarded until the designers are ready
to commit to a buildable version.
Thus, the medication redistribution blockchain
project is risky, and (unfortunately) this CEOchampion does not fully recognize many of the risks.

4.2 AI and a Dangerous CEO
The CEO of a US-based physician group led his
organization since its founding with ten physicians
more than 20 years ago. Today it provides
administrative services to more than 500 providers.
In 2017 the CEO sought a solution to the company’s
medical coding compliance problem. Medical coding
is complex, knowledge-intensive, and criticallyimportant for claims billing.
When a physician (or other healthcare provider)
sees a patient, they document the encounter by
dictating notes for professional transcription by a
third party, or by entering notes into template-based
software that integrates with an electronic medical
record. Newer approaches to documentation are
gaining ground, including speech recognition
software that captures a doctor’s comments for
automatic transcription (in 2019, speech recognition
software is used extensively by professional
transcriptionists, and to a much lower extent by
physicians). Medical coding needs to correctly align
with this documentation. Codes provide a structured
description of the encounter, the patient’s condition
and/or diagnosis, and procedures the provider used to
treat them. Various medical codes (including socalled evaluation-and-management CPT codes1,
which were the focus of the innovation described in
this case) must align with the provider’s
documentation in the patient’s medical record;
otherwise, a third-party payer (whether private or
public insurer) might refuse a claim (or subsequently
demand some of their money back). In 2015, ICD-10,
an internationally-supported diagnostic code set,
replaced a far smaller ICD set. This greatly increased
the complexity of aligning ICD codes with
documentation and with CPT codes. It created
challenges for providers seeking to be paid correctly
and to avoid costly penalties or reputational harm. In
this knowledge-intensive domain of medical coding,
experts predict artificial intelligence (AI) will
someday shoulder much of the code-selection burden.
However, much work needs to be undertaken before
1

“CPT” sounds for Current Procedure Terminology.
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AI solutions are available for all forms of coding in
all medical specialties.
Since this physician group has grown to its
current size of 500 providers, and since it operates at
a profit, we assume its CEO is a generally competent
manager and leader. He has not received formal IT
training, but he is quite enthusiastic about IT
innovations. When an acquaintance mentioned their
company’s work on an AI solution for one form of
coding, the CEO was eager to adopt it. If his friend’s
software solution worked, it would dramatically
reduce the firm’s cost of verifying that providers
entered appropriate billing codes, which would
reduce the likelihood of recoupment demands or
penalties (such as those imposed by Medicare). He
hoped that eventually his friend’s company could
offer software that would fully automate the medical
coding process; this would free up providers’ time to
help them provide attentive patient care.
This champion is dangerous. He overlooks the
risk in the fact that this will be the first-ever
application of natural language interpretation and
machine learning in the evaluation-and-management
CPT medical coding domain. In signing the contract,
he saw tremendous long-term upside potential but
failed to recognize a high financial risk: the physician
group was required to pay the software vendor for
each examined claim, even though the group would
give the vendor a massive amount of their claims data
(a very large data set is essential to effective machine
learning in this domain). He did not recognize the
contract transferred great financial risk to his firm,
while minimizing the vendor’s costs (the vendor
would receive the claims data free of charge).
Several project risks were also high. No one in the
physician group IS organization had AI expertise,
adding to the already-high technical risk (it would be
difficult for them to evaluate the vendor’s work).
Even the vendor’s technical expertise risk was at
least moderately high (since this is to be a first-of-its
kind solution). Some organizational risks also
threatened the project. The group had never before
collaborated on a project like this (they had
successfully implemented some packaged software,
but this project would present far greater technical
complexity). Our case study learned that the software
vendor did not display strong cross-organizational
expertise (although it apparently did have a good
track record of managing its own projects).
Before the scheduled project launch, a newlyhired middle manager met with the CEO to explain
why the planned project would be very risky.
Worried the meeting might not go well, this
whistleblower updated their resume. Fortunately, the
CEO responded constructively to this intervention.

Acting on their advice, the CEO insisted that the
contract needed to be re-negotiated to protect the
group’s interests. The vendor agreed not to charge the
group for its claims reviews, and the CEO agreed to
freely provide the large quantity of claims data the
vendor needed for the machine learning. At the
whistleblower’s suggestion, the CEO also approved
several parallel coding quality projects that would
focus on organizational issues (such as by working
closely with those providers poor coding quality
records). These projects ensured that if the machine
learning project took a long time to generate value,
the company should nevertheless improve its claims
coding quality and (hopefully) avoid costly penalties.
This is a near-miss situation; this dangerous IT
innovation champion would have put both the project
and his organization at great risk. Post-intervention,
the collaboration has moved forward on dramatically
different terms: a new contract states that until the AI
software consistently demonstrates 95% accuracy,
the physician group owes no money to the vendor.
The newcomer, who now oversees the project, has
put in place several mechanisms to mitigate other
project risks (in recognition of the group’s technical
expertise shortcomings, potential communication
problems, and other risks). The whistleblower also is
in the process of developing contingency plans to
handle problems should they nevertheless arise
during the machine learning project.

4.3 A Dangerously Agile CIO
In 2012 the new CIO of a large multi-national
systems development organization embarked on a
“digital transformation” of its technology division,
which employed more than 20,000 staff in eight U.S.
cities and in Australia, China, India, Ireland, and the
U.K. The CIO aimed to improve productivity and
increase and enable all aspects of workforce diversity
– from improving gender balance across the
organization, to enabling remote working, flexible
hours and implementing a ‘bring your own device’
that would free staff from fixed technologies and
strict technology supplier contracts.
The first sign that this CIO was a dangerous
champion was revealed in an evaluation exercise to
choose which large-scale agile method would be
used. The evaluation pointed to many significant
downsides of the Scaled Agile Framework (SaFe) –
one of the most concerning being the view that SaFe
is not suited to a heavily regulated industry with strict
compliance requirements. The evaluation also
revealed that the existing method (put in place before
the CIO’s appointment) was “a clear winner both in
terms of track record and suitability.” Nevertheless,

7
Page 6150

the CIO chose SaFe. He was certain it would improve
productivity, and he felt “a fresh start was needed”
and that staff needed a “new label to grab on to.”
The SaFe choice was problematic, since more
than 65% of the firm’s clients were heavily-regulated
medical organizations, subject to various compliance
requirements. In the first six months since SaFe
adoption, most metrics deteriorated, including
defects, time-to-delivery, sprint rhythm, and staff
retention. After 12 months, a senior executive
reported that some metrics showed improvement and
no metric had deteriorated further. She reported
“growing confidence” among some (not all) key
staff. However, by then 14% of the company’s clients
had left, due to compliance concerns.
In June 2013, confronting a problematic year-end
report, the CIO decided to introduce a new agile
development variant that was used effectively by
Spotify. All staff were re-trained for new roles, and
new seating arrangements were put in place. Again,
performance metrics declined. Some developers,
feeling “burned” by the SaFe initiative, did not
change their practices. Some overtly refused to
change, and others covertly did “what we always do
… while calling it whatever the CIO wants to hear”.
Many employees stated that cynicism, frustration and
tension built in 2013 and 2014. One developer called
it “the single biggest culture change in the 22 years
I’ve been here.”
In 2015 the CIO, believing that no publiclyavailable agile method would fit his company’s
needs, moved to a newly developed in-house method.
Yet, the same issues that plagued the other methods
continued to exist. One cynical study participant
stated the CIO “believes everything can be changed
by a label. If this method doesn’t work, get a new
one. If that doesn’t work, change again. [The CIO
thinks] it is the people that are wrong and that a new
method will fix them.”
Next, the CIO declared that AI, which could
identify better patterns and rhythms of work, would
fix the issues the development effort had experienced
in the past six years. All staff underwent AI training,
and by 2019 they were required to demonstrate their
use of AI and machine learning in their work. Yet,
recently the CIO stated that available AI tools were
falling short of what his team needed.

5. Discussion and Conclusions
Prior research contributed to an understanding of
effective IT innovation champions: they spot a highpotential emerging artifact; articulate a persuasive
case/vision of the value this can bring; embody the
necessary leadership characteristics to inspire others;

and draw on IT-specific capabilities to derive value
form the innovation. We observed that many prior
empirical studies focused on effective champions and
did not provide substantial evidence about ineffective
or dangerous champions (several papers did call for
further study of ineffective or dangerous champions).
Our contribution was to identify dangerous IT
innovation champions in field-based case studies and
juxtapose their key behaviors and characteristics with
those of ideally-effective IT innovation champion.
Like all champions, dangerous champions state a
persuasive vision; however dangerous champions put
their organizations at unacceptably high risk.
Sometimes (not always) the risk is realized – the
champion fails to derive value from the promising IT
innovation they promoted, or their actions cause
financial or reputational harm. They are dangerous
because of gaps in their knowledge and capabilities,
and/or because of their attentional focus. Because
they lack knowledge of IT risks and controls, they
fail to identify and mitigate relevant project risks or
operational risks. Because they focus on a compelling
future vision driven by investments in innovative
technologies, they fail to notice operational issues
close at hand. Thus, our field research indicates that
effective and dangerous IT champions can be
usefully described along these two dimensions of
attention and knowledge/capabilities (Fig. 1).

Figure 1, IT Innovation Champions
Similar to the catering company CEO in the
Alvalade case (described in Section 1), the two CEOs
presented in Section 3 are technology enthusiasts
who lack high-level technology-management skills.
Like the CEO from the class case, these two CEO
champions successfully persuaded others to share
their vision – so much so that they created
dangerously unrealistic expectations about the
likelihood that the innovation will be implemented
successfully. Because their vision was oriented to
future benefits, and because they were unaware of
their knowledge and capability gaps, they failed to
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attend to risks that could delay or derail the project.
Our two dangerous IT innovation champions might
not recognize the harm that can befall their
organization’s finances and reputation, if the
implemented innovation does not work correctly.
In case 4.1 the enthusiastic pharmacist/social
entrepreneur/CEO is moving forward with many
projects at a rapid pace, with little or no consideration
of mounting business and project risks. His aim is
laudatory, yet his ability to execute on his vision is
questionable. He does not have a demonstrable track
record of building entrepreneurial ventures (moving
from vulnerable startup to long-term sustainability).
Although he has articulated a persuasive vision for
the use of blockchain to support a medication reuse
operation, he has not installed processes and controls
in place to ensure that patients will be protected from
harm; and he has also not ensured that his several IT
innovation ventures can survive if their projects are
delayed or their systems are flawed.
In Case 4.2 a middle manager’s timely (and
brave) intervention focuses the CEO’s attention on
business and project risks, and convinces him to
renegotiate the contract with the vendor and allocate
some resources to other projects that can help ensure
their coding compliance issues are dealt with in the
event that the innovative use of natural language
interpretation software and machine learning
encounters some obstacles. We hope they will now
successfully collaborate with the software vendor. It
is too early to predict whether this risky AI project
will succeed, but the newcomer’s intervention
reduced the physician group’s risk considerably.
In Case 4.3 the CIO touts the latest and greatest
“flavors” of agile development. Unlike the
CareGroup CIO, he has not experienced a dramatic
crisis. Like a lobster in a pot, he might not recognize
how hot the water is getting, until it’s too late. Both
CIOs touted the benefits of IT innovations, and both
CIOs failed to notice operational evidence of trouble
brewing. Neither of these two CIOs recognized how
and why procedures, processes, and controls help
prevent trouble, even though textbooks indicate a
CIO should oversee these.
All three dangerous IT innovation champions in
our recent studies fit in the upper left quadrant of
Figure 1 (Charismatic Dangerous IT Innovation
Champions). Gaps in their knowledge/ capability sets
left their organizations vulnerable to high project
risks (because the champions did not institute or
require specific mechanisms for mitigating technical
risks, organizational risks, interdependence risks, and
other project risks). These executives are unlikely to
notice signals that the IT innovation project team is
making poor technical decisions, communicating

poorly with other stakeholders, ignoring threats to
information quality, and so on.
The bottom half of the grid depicts two other
scenarios. In the lower left quadrant, the hypothetical
IT innovation champion at first articulates a
persuasive vision (by definition) but subsequently
fails to see the forest for the trees. This micromanager has trouble delegating operational work
(and might not recognize their own knowledge/
capability gaps), and will likely alienate project team
members, who need inspiration to continue when
they encounter occasional technical challenges. An
effective leader relies on a well-designed executive
dashboard to monitor key metrics, and otherwise
focuses on supporting the development team.
In the bottom right quadrant is a leader who
effectively attends to relevant operational details
(because they have the IT knowledge/capability set to
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant details).
This IT Innovation Champion initially articulated a
persuasive vision for the innovation (by definition),
yet over time their attention increasingly focused on
the details. Their strong IT knowledge makes them
better suited to the role of reliable supervisor, who is
likely to spot problems early and help fix them. This
person will likely insist on a disciplined/ systematic
approach to ensuring system reliability.
In the upper right quadrant is the ideal Effective
IT Innovation Champion. Some of these champions
combine the strong vision with strong IT knowledge
and capabilities. Others recognize the gaps in their IT
knowledge and capabilities, and know when to rely
on people who have the requisite knowledge. When
this champion is supported by a Reliable Supervisor
(lower right quadrant), their capabilities are
complementary: the champion sees the big picture,
inspires the team, and marshals necessary resources,
while the Reliable Supervisor attends to necessary
details, spots problems, and helps fix them before
they become bigger problems.
Based on these findings, we offer five
propositions about IT innovation champions:
Proposition 1: As an IT innovation champion, an
effective and mindful CIO attends to a long-term,
strategic vision of value-from-IT-innovation, and
monitors and provides useful resources and other
forms of support to IT innovation projects.
Proposition 2: A second-in-command Reliable
Supervisor can complement the CIO’s long-term
vision by closely attending to ongoing operational
risks and closely monitoring the innovation project.
Proposition 3: In order to develop the knowledge
to work effectively with a second-in-command, it is
helpful if the CIO previously worked in the Reliable
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Supervisor role, before transitioning to IT innovation
champion and leader.
Proposition 4: As an IT innovation champion, an
effective and mindful CEO recognizes his/her ITrelated knowledge and capability gaps, and verifies
that the CIO (or office of the CIO) demonstrate
strong knowledge and capabilities related to both IT
innovation and operational reliability.
Proposition 5: To support IT innovation, a
mindful Board of Directors recognizes the dual
requirements (and challenges) of articulating a
contextually-relevant strategic IT innovation value
proposition and ensuring consistently reliable ITenabled operations.
Our arguments and case study findings begin to
answer calls for studies of dangerous champions
(high-level champions such as those discussed in this
paper, as well as IT innovation champions who
emerge from the middle ranks of the organizational
hierarchy).
We hope others will join us in
conducting further in-depth qualitative and
quantitative studies to test, refine, and debate our
propositions about how and why dangerous IT
innovation champions expose their organizations to
high risks, and how the Board of Directors and other
leaders can spot dangerous champions sufficiently
early to take steps to mitigate project risks and
operational risks that can bring financial and
reputational harm to the organization.
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